Terrorism Defined

Aaron Hillyer

Professor Shirk

POL 357B: Global Politics of Terrorism

Terrorism Defined

            Possibly the most pressing issue in the ongoing global fight against terrorism arises from the ambiguity around our understanding of the word ‘terrorism.’ To be able to effectively destroy an enemy, one must first be able to clearly define who that enemy is. What, then, makes someone a ‘terrorist?’ How do we determine what activities, groups, and strategies constitute terrorism? Terror, as it is commonly understood, is the intentional creation of an environment of fear or chaos against a targeted population. Terrorism, therefore, must be the use of terror as a strategy with the purpose of achieving a goal. Modern scholars and politicians typically apply this understanding to a political context and often include violence as a necessary element to the ‘terrorism’ label. So then ‘terrorism’ can logically be defined as: the strategic use of threats or violence to foment fear among a target population for the purpose of achieving a political goal.

            Sociologist Charles Tilly presents a convincing argument for this kind of definition, supported with evidence from the US State Department’s terrorism reports that contradicts the Department’s own stricter definition. Tilly includes in his definition any “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime.” (Tilly 5). The State Department however classifies terrorism as any “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (US State Dept.). While this definition clearly applies to many modern terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al-Shabab, it does not seem to include many other groups or actions that make use of terror and violence to achieve political ends. The French ‘Reign of Terror’ of 1793-4 was the event that initially caused ‘terrorism’ to enter common parlance, yet it would not fall under the State Department’s definition because it was perpetrated by the reigning government rather than a subnational group. Attacks against US Military personnel stationed overseas, such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings or the series of bombing attacks carried out against American soldiers during the Iraq War, would not fall under the State Department definition because they were directed against military combatants. Yet, most people today would consider these to be acts of terrorism. Tilly’s definition is much more encompassing of these types of attacks and much more closely fits what most people would consider to constitute terrorism. Terrorism in his understanding is not a specific and easily measurable phenomenon, but a series of “strategies that recur across a wide variety of actors and political situations” (Tilly 5). It can be used by any person or group in pursuit of political goals, and its methods vary widely.

            This understanding of terror as a universal strategy rather than a specific tactic against non-combatants by non-state actors is crucial to our comprehension of the brutal terror directed by states against civilians. From the Red Terror of the Bolshevik regime in Russia to the unfathomable scale of Maoist China’s slaughter of civilians, all the way up to the alleged ongoing terror of the North Korean regime against its own people, state terrorism far surpasses the casualty levels attributable to terrorism committed by non-state actors. Yet there are still those who consider terrorism to be a phenomenon distinct from the atrocities of state repression. Philip Bobbit describes terrorism as an act against the state or the current order, saying, “terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d' etre of the dominant constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that form's unique ideology” (Bobbit 26). This view would seem to exclude acts of terror conducted by states, since the state represents the current constitutional order. This becomes problematic when we look at cases of state entities intentionally killing non-combatants and crafting an environment of fear for the purpose of asserting its authority or quelling dissent. If these instances are not to be considered terrorism, since they do not oppose the regime, then they become much more difficult for the international community to respond to. A government exercising its authority over its own civilians cannot easily be stopped by other states or international organizations without appearing to violate the sovereignty of the offending state. Calling these acts ‘terrorism’ gives the international community just cause to intervene without breaking conventions on sovereignty. When we look at ‘terrorism’ as a strategy that any people or groups can use, including states, then that label and any intervention that follows becomes better justified.

             Viewing terrorism as a strategy is also a defense against those who would classify the term a vague social or political construct. Lisa Stampnitzky argues that the concept of terrorism was entirely created by academics and experts sometime during the 1970s, and arose out of a shift in discourse from state terrorism to insurgent terrorism in response to the Vietnam War and the PLO hostage crisis. Since then, she says, ‘terrorism’ has become “an inherently problematic concept - undefinable, infused with moral absolutism, and deeply politicized” (Stampnitzky 9). As a constructed concept, the ‘terrorism’ designation must then carry a degree of bias and wider political motivations that may threaten to undermine its reliability. Why should we trust the State Department’s classification of certain rebel groups as terrorists, for instance, when obviously the United States government has its own political motivations for discrediting a potentially legitimate rebel actor? The fact that many ‘terrorist’ groups call themselves ‘freedom fighters’ seems to play heavily on the idea that ‘terrorism’ is an inherently politicized and difficult to define concept. This can severely complicate counter-terrorism efforts, as the ability for terrorists to redefine themselves based on the lack of a coherent definition for terrorism can help them to gain support among the civilian populations. Understanding terrorism as simply the strategy of creating fear for political purposes solves this issue to a large extent. It allows us to look at terrorist actors objectively and define them as such based solely on the way they act rather than their political motivations.

            Defining terrorism as a strategy of using fear and intimidation to promote a political goal provides a clear framework for how to understand and combat terrorism. This definition is broad enough to include state terrorism (as in the current case of North Korea) as well as terror committed by groups like ISIS and even so-called ‘lone-wolf’ attacks. But it is not too broad or vague that it becomes unclear who or what constitutes a terrorist as opposed to a freedom fighter or a tyrant. This definition also allows us to create effective response strategies that focus on the nature of terrorism itself rather than trying to create different responses for each instance of terrorism individually. Recognizing the rationality of the strategy and the intended goal of fomenting fear allows us to counter the effectiveness of terrorism by controlling the public response to it. Preventing the intended fear from taking root by controlling the media narrative, for instance, could help make terrorism an obsolete tactic and discourage other attacks in the future.

References:

1.      Tilly, Charles. Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, “Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium.” American Sociological Association (2004). http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648955

2.      Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. “Country Report on Terrorism.” US Department of State (2016). https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf

3.      Bobbit, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. Alfred A. Knopf (2008). ISBN: 978-I-4000-4243-2

4.      Stampnitzky, Lisa. Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented "Terrorism." Cambridge University Press (2013).  ISBN: 9781107026636